Operationalizing Practical Wisdom

Book Proposal

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Rationale for Publication

Practical wisdom has been recognized as indispensable since Aristotle named it the master virtue enabling human flourishing, yet philosophy has never produced tools that make it teachable, assessable, or systematically cultivable. Two literatures have developed in parallel without resolving this gap. The philosophical tradition, running from Aristotle through contemporary virtue ethics, treats practical wisdom as a value worth pursuing without specifying operational criteria for recognizing it in practice. The empirical wisdom research tradition, from Baltes and Staudinger's Berlin paradigm through Igor Grossmann's psychometric work, has built measurement instruments without adequately justifying the normative standard those instruments are measuring against. Both traditions identify practical wisdom as valuable; neither has made it operational.

This gap has been profoundly costly in education and social life. Contemporary public life exhibits what has been characterized as a post-truth condition, in which appeals to emotion and tribal identity increasingly override evidence and argument, and expert authority is met with reflexive suspicion rather than engagement. At the same time, educational systems remain organized around the transmission and assessment of content knowledge, effectively leaving judgment (the capacity to interpret ambiguous situations and act well under uncertainty) untaught. The book argues that this crisis is not a shortage of information but a deficit in practical wisdom, and that the deficit persists because Western philosophy's dominant epistemological framework (correspondence theory) is structurally unsuited to the domains where wisdom is most needed. That ancient framework fails wherever no mind-independent fact of the matter is available to settle the question: judgments about uncertain futures, contested values, and ambiguous evidence.

Operationalizing Practical Wisdom addresses this gap directly. It develops a neopragmatic evaluative framework built on three operative criteria: coherence, utility, and morality. Together, these three values provide workable standards for practical judgment without requiring correspondence to an inaccessible objective reality.

The book is timely both philosophically (as post-Rortian approaches to evaluation gain renewed attention) and practically (as educators, professionals, and public institutions face intensifying pressure to cultivate sound judgment rather than mere information competence).

Description of the Book

Operationalizing Practical Wisdom argues that practical wisdom has resisted operationalization not from insufficient philosophical effort, but from a category error: Western philosophy has tried to specify judgment quality using a correspondence-based conception of truth that cannot, in principle, apply to the domains where wisdom matters most (as described above). The book replaces correspondence with a novel neopragmatic philosophical framework which is built on three evaluative criteria. It demonstrates that practical wisdom operates through accommodation (the revision of interpretive frameworks when they prove inadequate) and reflective equilibrium (the mutual adjustment of principles and judgments toward consistency). Building upon this theoretical foundation, the book grounds the framework in the psychological mechanisms that enable or obstruct wise judgment, and then applies it systematically across education, professional practice, public discourse, and collective decision-making. Finally, it translates the full framework into concrete, teachable practices. The result is a philosophical account of practical wisdom that is both rigorous and utile: assessable by researchers, teachable by educators, and practicable by individuals navigating judgment under uncertainty.

Readership

The book is written for scholars in philosophy, particularly in epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of education, who require an operational account of practical wisdom that has so far been missing from the tradition, as well as for scholars in the empirical wisdom research tradition in psychology who require a more rigorous normative foundation for their assessment instruments. It will also serve graduate students in these fields, teacher educators and curriculum designers seeking a theoretically grounded basis for cultivating judgment rather than content mastery alone, and professionals in fields requiring sound judgment under uncertainty, including education, healthcare, and organizational leadership. The work engages philosophy, psychology, and education, but its primary contribution and its most rigorous argumentation are philosophical. Readers in psychology and education are especially served by the chapters applying the framework to their domains, while the full theoretical apparatus will be of greatest interest to philosophers.

Annotated Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter diagnoses why practical wisdom has resisted operationalization despite twenty-five centuries of philosophical attention. It argues that contemporary society exhibits a judgment crisis rather than an information deficit: people increasingly have access to vast stores of factual knowledge while struggling with basic tasks of interpretation, evaluation, and decision under uncertainty. The chapter traces this failure to Western philosophy's commitment to correspondence theory, which treats sound judgment as the discovery of pre-existing truths rather than the construction of workable interpretations, and shows why this commitment makes wisdom operationally inert in precisely the domains where it is most needed. It surveys the classical virtue-ethics tradition and the empirical psychometric wisdom-research tradition, showing that both value practical wisdom without providing the tools to develop it systematically. The chapter closes by arguing that a concept can remain contested in its ultimate nature while still admitting criteria sufficient for rigorous assessment.

Chapter 2: The Operational Framework

This chapter develops the book's central theoretical contribution: a philosophical framework for evaluating practical wisdom through the criteria of coherence, utility, and morality, which together provide adequate evaluative standards without requiring correspondence to an inaccessible objective reality. It defines each criterion in detail, explains why each becomes indispensable where correspondence theory fails, judging uncertain futures, interpreting ambiguous evidence, and adjudicating value conflicts, and demonstrates how practical wisdom operates through accommodation and reflective equilibrium. Drawing on twentieth-century epistemology, the chapter argues that these three criteria do not supplement correspondence-based evaluation but replace it for the domains at issue. The chapter's goal is practical rather than theoretical: to make practical wisdom systematically teachable, reliably assessable, and deliberately cultivable through methods usable by educators, researchers, and individuals alike.

Chapter 3: The Psychology of Practical Wisdom: How Judgment Develops

This chapter examines the psychological architecture that practical wisdom must work within (and also against). It argues that the human mind is not a neutral instrument that produces sound judgment given adequate information, but a system shaped by evolutionary pressures favoring rapid response, certainty, pattern recognition, and self-protective reasoning over careful, revisable interpretation. Understanding why wisdom is psychologically difficult is part of the process by which wisdom is cultivated. The chapter examines the conditions under which experience produces practical wisdom rather than mere habituation, distinguishing productive reflection from unproductive rumination, and analyzing transformative learning as it emerges through

disequilibrium. It identifies specific psychological capacities (metacognitive awareness, emotional regulation, epistemic humility, and tolerance of ambiguity) that practical wisdom development requires, grounding the philosophical framework of Chapter 2 in cognitive and developmental psychology without reducing the philosophical claims to psychological ones.

Chapter 4: Learning From Experience: Using Mistakes as Data

This chapter examines how the psychological capacities identified in Chapter 3 enable deeply coherent learning from lived experience, focusing specifically on how individuals can treat mistakes as data for interpretation rather than as verdicts on their competence or identity. It develops the concept of accommodation, introduced in the prior chapter, as the revision of interpretive frameworks when they prove inadequate, contrasting it with the more comfortable but less productive process of assimilation, in which new experience is simply fitted into existing schemas with minimal adjustment. The chapter analyzes why accommodation is psychologically difficult, since mistakes can threaten a person's self-image as competent and confident, and it examines the range of possible responses to disconfirming experience, from defensive denial through productive revision. Growth mindset is analyzed as a key enabling disposition. The chapter closes by connecting these individual learning mechanisms to the educational applications developed in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5: Practical Wisdom in Education: Why Content Alone Is Not Enough

This chapter applies the book's framework to classroom education, arguing that mastering content without developing judgment capacity leaves students competent but not wise. It analyzes the dominant model of contemporary schooling, organized around the transmission of information and the demonstration of measurable competency, and shows (drawing on Freire's critique of the banking model of education) that this model fails all three of the book's evaluative criteria simultaneously. It lacks coherence because it treats education as information transfer while claiming to develop judgment, it fails on utility because content mastery does not reliably transfer to procedural judgment under real conditions, and it fails on the moral criterion because it does not treat students as active interpreters responsible for their own understanding. The chapter proposes concrete pedagogical alternatives (including inquiry-based learning, problem-based learning, and Socratic dialogue) which support the development of the interpretive and evaluative capacities the framework requires. It argues that systematic wisdom cultivation during the school years can establish patterns of judgment that persist across a lifespan, making educational practice a critical leverage point for addressing the judgment crisis diagnosed in Chapter 1.

Chapter 6: Practical Wisdom Under Professional Constraints

This chapter examines how the demands of professional life (time pressure, incomplete information, and accountability to multiple stakeholders) intensify the challenges of practical

judgment analyzed in earlier chapters. It argues that the distinction between facts and interpretations becomes especially consequential in professional settings because expertise itself can generate the illusion of certainty, leading practitioners to present contestable interpretations as settled facts. Using medical diagnosis as an extended illustration, the chapter shows how professional judgment operates as an interpretive practice, rather than a mechanical application of rules, even in domains that appear maximally rule-governed. It examines decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and it examines the problem of alignment between a professional's espoused values and their enacted conduct (drawing on Schön's account of reflective practice and Argyris's distinction between espoused and actual theories of action). The chapter demonstrates that the book's framework applies with particular force in professional contexts, where the costs of unexamined judgment are highest and most visible.

Chapter 7: Practical Wisdom in a Post-Truth World

This chapter turns from professional to public judgment, examining contemporary discourse's post-truth dynamics, in which appeals to emotion and tribal identity override concern for evidence, where political polarization results in disagreement itself being experienced as an existential threat. It argues against the common assumption that post-truth culture is a direct consequence of postmodern philosophy's recognition that truth cannot function as absolute certainty, distinguishing this legitimate epistemological insight from a license for motivated reasoning. Drawing on Kahan's work on identity-protective cognition, the chapter shows that partisans across the political spectrum cite evidence and invoke expertise in ways that serve group defensiveness rather than genuine inquiry, reproducing the surface features of rational argument while systematically evading its substance. The chapter proposes intellectual humility combined with intellectual responsibility as the foundation for constructive civic engagement, showing how the framework provides resources for responsible public judgment that neither collapses into relativism nor requires an inaccessible standard of objective truth.

Chapter 8: Leadership and Relationships: Collective Judgment

This chapter extends the book's focus from analysis of individual performance to the recognition that consequential judgments are also made in relationship with others, within organizations, communities, and partnerships, and that this particular aspect of social life shapes what gets noticed, valued, and performed. It argues that wisdom in social contexts requires creating conditions under which shared clarity can emerge, rather than insisting on the maintenance of individual certainty (since even well-developed individual judgment remains subject to blind spots visible to others but not to oneself). The chapter reframes leadership away from the popular image of a decisive individual whose superior judgment cuts through uncertainty, substituting the more demanding task of shaping organizational environments that enable good collective judgment to emerge, drawing on Heifetz's account of adaptive leadership and Edmondson's research on

psychological safety. It treats relational dynamics generally (not just formal leadership), as sites where wisdom is exercised through the deliberate cultivation of conditions for mutual development rather than through individual assertion.

Chapter 9: Cultivating Practical Wisdom: Becoming a Little Wiser Every Day

This chapter translates the book's abstract theoretical apparatus into concrete, teachable practices, completing the operationalization promised in the book's title. It argues that practical wisdom develops the way most durable human capacities develop, through repeated practice, sustained attention, and honest self-examination, rather than through occasional dramatic insight, and that this incremental model reflects both psychological realism about habit formation and the philosophical claim that wisdom consists of making sound interpretations reliably across diverse situations rather than possessing a fixed body of knowledge. The chapter specifies three operational practices, attention (noticing what is actually occurring rather than what habit assumes), reflection (systematically examining experience to extract learning), and decision (consciously selecting among alternatives using explicit criteria), and shows how these practices instantiate the coherence, utility, and morality criteria in daily life. It also addresses the primary obstacle to sustained practice, which the chapter identifies as motivational rather than cognitive: people often already know what wisdom would require and fail to act on that knowledge consistently. We may fail to distinguish facts from interpretations, resist accommodation when frameworks prove inadequate, and apply the three criteria defensively; not primarily because these capacities are difficult to learn, but because exercising them honestly threatens something they are invested in protecting.

Chapter 10: Contributions and Implications

The concluding chapter synthesizes the book's arguments and summarizes its contributions across philosophy, psychology, and education. It restates the operationalization failure diagnosed in Chapter 1 as a structural consequence of correspondence theory's inapplicability to domains involving uncertain futures, ambiguous evidence, and contested values, and reviews how the three-criteria framework developed in Chapter 2 resolves this failure by replacing correspondence with observable, applicable standards. Each subsequent chapter's contributions are recapitulated, showing how the argument builds cumulatively toward a complete account. It closes by considering the framework's implications for future research, arguing that this operationalized construct of practical wisdom enables systematic empirical study, effective curriculum design, and expert professional development in ways that the prior literature's under-theorized normative standards do not support.

Similar / Competing Titles

Barry Schwartz and Kenneth Sharpe, Practical Wisdom: The Right Way to Do the Right Thing (Riverhead, 2010). A trade-oriented, Aristotelian account arguing that rules and incentives cannot substitute for practical judgment. Unlike Operationalizing Practical Wisdom, it does not develop a systematic evaluative framework or address the correspondence-theory obstacle to operationalization, and it is written for a general audience rather than an academic one.

Igor Grossmann et al., the empirical wisdom-research literature associated with the Toronto and CHI wisdom labs (various journal publications rather than a single monograph). This body of work develops psychometric instruments for measuring wise reasoning. Operationalizing Practical Wisdom engages this literature directly, arguing that it presupposes a normative theory of judgment quality that it has not itself supplied, and offers that theory.

Paul Baltes and Ursula Staudinger, the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm (primarily journal literature, e.g., Baltes & Staudinger, 2000, American Psychologist). An influential empirical framework defining wisdom as expert knowledge in the fundamental pragmatics of life. Like the Grossmann tradition, it measures wisdom-related performance without offering a philosophical justification for the standard being measured, which this book supplies.

Robert Sternberg, various works including Wisdom, Intelligence, and Creativity Synthesized (Cambridge, 2003) and later edited volumes. Sternberg's balance theory treats wisdom as the application of intelligence and creativity toward a common good through the balancing of interests. The account remains descriptive and psychological rather than offering an operational evaluative framework grounded in a neopragmatic epistemology.

Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, 1981) and subsequent work. A foundational contemporary source for virtue-ethical accounts of practical reason, engaged critically within Operationalizing Practical Wisdom rather than competing with it directly; MacIntyre diagnoses the fragmentation of moral discourse without offering the operational criteria this book develops.

Size

The completed manuscript is approximately 63,500 words, comprising ten chapters plus introductory and concluding material.

Date of Completion

The manuscript can be submitted immediately upon request.

Sample Chapters

Chapter 1: Introduction

The world has never been more informed or less wise.

University graduates consult vast stores of factual knowledge across disciplines, yet struggle with basic judgment tasks (including distinguishing reliable sources from unreliable ones, making decisions under uncertainty without demanding impossible guarantees, and managing disagreement without experiencing it as personal attack) (Arum & Roksa, 2011; Kahneman, 2011; Nichols, 2017; Kakutani, 2018). Professional expertise has reached levels of technical sophistication unknown in human history, yet experts routinely fail at prediction, demonstrate overconfidence uncorrelated with accuracy, and resist revising beliefs despite contrary evidence (Tetlock, 2005; Dunning, 2011). Political discourse drowns in data while abandoning reasoned deliberation, with partisans selectively deploying facts as weapons rather than using evidence as shared standards for evaluation (Kahan, 2013; McIntyre, 2018). The paradox proves inescapable: more information correlates with worse judgment.

The Practical Wisdom Puzzle

Practical wisdom has resisted operationalization because Western philosophy's commitment to correspondence theory treats judgment as discovering pre-existing truths rather than constructing workable interpretations.

This crisis of judgment is not due to a scarcity of information but a deficit in practical wisdom (the capacity for sound judgment in particular circumstances that integrates cognitive, emotional, and moral dimensions). This subject has occupied philosophy's attention for twenty-five centuries, celebrated by Aristotle as the master virtue enabling human flourishing, invoked by Stoics as the foundation of the good life, and pursued by contemporary researchers as essential for navigating complexity (Aristotle, 350 BCE/1999; Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Schwartz & Sharpe, 2010). Yet despite sustained philosophical inquiry and empirical investigation, practical wisdom remains what Gallie (1956) termed an "essentially contested concept": widely valued but diversely interpreted, praised in theory but elusive in practice, recognized as important but never successfully operationalized in ways that make it systematically teachable or reliably measurable. Educators do not know how to cultivate it, organizations cannot assess it, individuals struggle to develop it, and scholars cannot agree on what it is.

The thesis of this book is that 'essentially contested' does not mean 'operationally inert'; a concept can be contested about its ultimate nature while still admitting of criteria sufficient for assessment and cultivation.

This chapter argues that the operationalization failure stems from a fundamental conceptual obstacle rather than from insufficient effort or inadequate methodology. Western philosophy's dominant epistemological framework (correspondence theory, which assumes that true beliefs correspond to objective reality independent of human interpretation) positions judgment as discovering pre-existing truths rather than constructing workable interpretations (Kirkham, 1992; Lynch, 2001). This framework proves adequate for domains where observations can be verified against stable, publicly accessible phenomena: the temperature is 72°F, the cat is on the mat, water boils at 100°C at sea level. But practical wisdom operates precisely in domains where correspondence is unavailable, underdetermined, or irrelevant: when predicting uncertain futures, when evidence supports multiple incompatible interpretations equally well, or when values rather than facts determine appropriate action (Rorty, 1979; Putnam, 1981). Correspondence theory provides no mechanism for evaluating judgment in these circumstances, leaving practical wisdom conceptually displaced (acknowledged as important yet lacking intellectual foundation).

The chapter proceeds in four parts. It examines why contemporary life makes practical wisdom more necessary than ever, traces the classical philosophical treatment from Aristotle through contemporary virtue ethics, analyzes modern psychological measurement attempts, and identifies correspondence theory as the conceptual bottleneck preventing operationalization.

Why Wisdom Matters More Than Ever

Three interconnected developments make practical wisdom uniquely necessary for contemporary life, yet more difficult than ever to achieve: information overload that swamps cognitive capacity, complexity that defeats simplifying heuristics, and uncertainty that undermines confidence in expertise. These circumstances transform what previously appeared as a straightforward project (gathering facts, applying rules, following authorities) into interpretive challenges requiring judgment that information alone cannot provide.

Information overload describes the condition where available data exceeds processing capacity, forcing selectivity about what receives attention and how it gets interpreted (Eppler & Mengis, 2004; Bawden & Robinson, 2009). A medieval scholar might encounter dozens of texts in a lifetime; a contemporary student confronts thousands daily through digital media, with search engines returning millions of results for simple queries and social media delivering continuous streams of competing claims (Carr, 2010). This abundance creates paralysis rather than empowerment: more options correlate with decreased satisfaction, greater difficulty choosing, and increased likelihood of decision avoidance (Schwartz, 2004; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). The bottleneck proves cognitive rather than informational: humans cannot process exponentially increasing data using linear attention, cannot verify claims faster than they proliferate, and cannot maintain coherent understanding when confronted with contradictory assertions from apparently credible sources (Kahneman, 2011; Simon, 1971).

Navigating information abundance requires practical wisdom because selection constitutes interpretation: deciding which sources deserve attention, which claims warrant investigation, which evidence carries weight, and which arguments merit consideration all involve judgment that facts alone cannot determine. Facts consist of observations and measurements; beliefs about what those facts mean constitute interpretations rather than additional facts. This distinction proves critical yet widely misunderstood: information abundance provides more data but does not automatically yield better interpretations, and treating interpretations as if they were facts constitutes a primary source of judgment error.

A person researching medical treatments confronts peer-reviewed studies, pharmaceutical marketing, patient testimonials, alternative medicine claims, and conflicting expert opinions, with no algorithm for automatically identifying truth. Correspondence theory offers no help here: one cannot verify which interpretation corresponds to reality until after choosing it and experiencing consequences, yet the choice must be made using imperfect knowledge. Practical wisdom consists of navigating such situations through coherent integration of available evidence, pragmatic assessment of likely outcomes, and moral consideration of risks to oneself and others, even while acknowledging that certainty remains unavailable (Schwartz & Sharpe, 2010).

Complexity describes systems where components interact nonlinearly, producing emergent properties unpredictable from knowledge of parts, and where interventions generate unintended consequences through feedback loops and cascading effects (Mitchell, 2009; Waldrop, 1992). Climate systems, economic markets, social organizations, ecological networks, and political institutions all exhibit complexity that defeats reductionist analysis and frustrates attempts at control through simple rules (Meadows, 2008). A policy intervention that works in one context fails in another despite superficial similarity, experts who excel in stable domains prove helpless when conditions shift, and past performance predicts future results only until it doesn't (Taleb, 2007; Tetlock, 2005). The complexity means that technical expertise, while necessary, proves insufficient: knowing facts about components does not reveal how systems behave, and mastering established procedures provides no guidance when unprecedented situations emerge (Dorner, 1996).

Responding to complexity requires practical wisdom because it demands judgment about which features of situations matter, how current circumstances resemble or differ from past experience, what interventions might produce desired effects, and when standard approaches require modification (Klein, 1998; Hogarth, 2001). An educator confronting classroom disruption must interpret whether behavior reflects boredom, confusion, family stress, peer dynamics, or some combination of these possibilities, then select responses calibrated to actual causes rather than to surface manifestations. No algorithm generates these interpretations, no rule determines appropriate responses, and no expertise guarantees success: the teacher must judge, act, observe consequences, and revise their

understandings iteratively (Schön, 1983). Complexity thus amplifies uncertainty, because interventions in complex systems generate feedback effects that make future states less predictable than they were before the intervention.

Uncertainty pervades contemporary life because accelerating change makes past regularities unreliable predictors of future events, because globalization connects distant systems in ways that propagate shocks unpredictably, and because knowledge itself reveals how much remains unknown (Knight, 1921; Taleb, 2007). Financial markets crash despite sophisticated models, political upheavals surprise expert forecasters, technological innovations disrupt established industries, and scientific discoveries overturn confident theories (Tetlock, 2005; Kuhn, 1962). The uncertainty is not merely epistemic (a temporary ignorance that further research will remedy) but often ontological, stemming from genuine indeterminacy in complex adaptive systems where small variations produce divergent outcomes (Prigogine, 1997; Kauffman, 1995). Even perfect knowledge of present conditions cannot enable prediction because the systems are not fully deterministic.

Operating effectively under the condition of uncertainty requires practical wisdom because it necessitates action despite incomplete knowledge, revision of plans as circumstances change, and accountability for outcomes that cannot be perfectly foreseen (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). Correspondence theory proves useless here: one cannot verify that beliefs correspond to reality-as-it-will-be because the future does not yet exist to correspond to (Rorty, 1979). Instead, judgment must be evaluated through coherence with other beliefs and values, utility for navigating circumstances as they develop, and morality in treatment of those affected by decisions (Surkes, 2025).

A business leader choosing strategy cannot know which market conditions will obtain, yet must commit resources based on interpretation of trends, assessment of probabilities, and values about acceptable risk. Practical wisdom consists not in achieving certainty (impossible given genuine uncertainty) but in making sound judgments that acknowledge limitations while enabling effective action (Schwartz & Sharpe, 2010).

These three developments (information overload, complexity, and uncertainty) converge to create conditions where practical wisdom matters more than ever yet proves harder to achieve than in more stable, less connected, information-scarce contexts. This means that expertise, while valuable, cannot suffice: experts possess deep knowledge of established domains but often lack judgment required for navigating novelty, integrating across disciplines, or adapting when familiar patterns break down (Tetlock, 2005). Intelligence, while helpful, does not guarantee wisdom: highly intelligent people demonstrate the same cognitive biases as others, often with greater sophistication in rationalization (Stanovich, 2009; Kahan, 2013). Education, while necessary, does not automatically produce sound judgment: advanced degrees correlate with knowledge accumulation but not necessarily with capacity for coherent interpretation, pragmatic assessment, or moral consideration (Arum & Roksa, 2011; Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005). What contemporary life requires, and what current institutions largely fail to cultivate, is an integrated capacity for sound judgment that transcends mere information, expertise, or intelligence.

The Classical Tradition: Recognizing Wisdom Without Operationalizing It

Western philosophers have recognized practical wisdom's centrality since its inception, yet no one has yet specified a definitive account of its operational characteristics.

This section examines philosophic traditions from Aristotle through contemporary virtue ethics, revealing a consistent pattern: philosophers describe wisdom eloquently, distinguish it from related capacities convincingly, and advocate for its importance persuasively, yet leave its nature too vague for operative assessment.

Aristotle's account in the Nicomachean Ethics distinguishes practical wisdom (phronesis) from theoretical wisdom (sophia), technical skill (techne), scientific knowledge (episteme), and intuitive reason (nous) (Aristotle, 350 BCE/1999). Practical wisdom involves deliberating well about what is good and advantageous for living well in general, not in some particular domain like health or strength, but regarding the good life (eudaimonia) as a whole. It requires perceiving particular situations accurately, grasping their significances, and responding appropriately given the circumstances and applicable values.

The practically wise person sees what matters in situations that others overlook, recognizes when general rules apply and when they require modification, and acts for the right reasons rather than producing results without clear justification (Aristotle, 350 BCE/1999, Book VI).

Aristotle's analysis proves insightful, yet ultimately frustrating for operationalization. He characterizes practical wisdom through contrasts and examples rather than through explicit criteria: the wise person is like a good archer who hits the target, like a skilled navigator who reaches the destination, like an experienced physician who prescribes appropriate treatment (Aristotle, 350 BCE/1999). These analogies illuminate aspects of wisdom (its goal-directedness, its context-sensitivity, its integration of general principles with particular circumstances) but do not specify what makes judgment sound rather than unsound, wise rather than foolish. Aristotle's claim that practical wisdom involves hitting the mean between excess and deficiency begs the question: how does one identify the mean except through practical wisdom itself (Hursthouse, 1999)? His assertion that the wise person possesses the right "habitual disposition" to deliberate well merely relabels the problem rather than solving it (Annas, 2011). His examples of paradigmatically wise individuals (Pericles and similar political leaders) presuppose agreement about who counts as wise without providing independent criteria for making such judgments (Nussbaum, 1990).

The fundamental difficulty with Aristotle's approach is his grounding of practical wisdom in human nature and telos, claiming that virtues are excellences enabling fulfillment of human function, without verifying these metaphysical claims (MacIntyre, 1981).

Modern biology reveals human nature as a contingent product of evolution rather than as an essence with a predetermined telos. Modern anthropology grounds cultural variation in conceptions of good life, and modern philosophy questions whether normative conclusions can be derived from factual premises about nature (Hume, 1748/2007; Williams, 1985). Even if one accepts Aristotle's metaphysics, his account is not operational: saying that practical wisdom enables human flourishing does not specify how to recognize it, how to teach it, or how to measure it. The result is that Aristotelian virtue ethics, despite profound insights about practical wisdom's importance, leaves it essentially mysterious (a capacity possessed by some and not others, recognizable when encountered but inexplicable in its operation) (Annas, 2011).

Stoic philosophy develops a different account, identifying practical wisdom with knowledge of what is truly good (virtue) versus what appears good but is not (wealth, pleasure, reputation) (Epictetus, 125/1983; Marcus Aurelius, 170-180/2006). The practically wise person maintains tranquility by desiring only what is achievable through virtue, accepting what cannot be controlled, and distinguishing accurately between the two spheres.

This conception proves psychologically astute (much suffering stems from desiring what one cannot guarantee or fearing what one cannot prevent) and therapeutically useful, as demonstrated by cognitive therapy's Stoic foundations (Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1962). Yet it too fails operationalization because it provides no method for determining what actually lies within control versus outside it, no criteria for distinguishing true goods from apparent goods except the circular claim that true goods are those the wise person values, and no explanation of how wisdom itself is acquired beyond exhortations to practice it (Nussbaum, 1994).

Contemporary virtue ethics, revived by Anscombe (1958), MacIntyre (1981), and Foot (2001), attempts to overcome these limitations while preserving classical insights. MacIntyre argues that virtues are excellences enabling success in social practices that have internal goods, that practical wisdom consists of knowing how to navigate conflicts among practices and traditions, and that wisdom develops through apprenticeship in communities that embody and transmit practical knowledge (MacIntyre, 1981). Foot grounds virtues in facts about human needs and vulnerabilities, arguing that practical wisdom consists of recognizing how various excellences contribute to distinctively human flourishing (Foot, 2001). Hursthouse develops virtue ethics as normative theory rivaling consequentialism and deontology, claiming that an action is right if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances (Hursthouse, 1999).

These contemporary accounts advance understanding without supplying operational characteristics. MacIntyre's appeal to traditions and practices explains how wisdom gets transmitted socially but does not specify what makes

some traditional teachings wise and others foolish, what distinguishes justified from corrupt practices, or how wisdom can be taught to those outside established communities (Miller, 2003). Foot's naturalism grounds virtue in human nature more defensibly than Aristotle's teleology, but still faces the is-ought problem: even granting facts about human needs, how do normative conclusions follow without additional evaluative premises (Williams, 1985)? Hursthouse's criterion (do what the virtuous person would do) proves circular because identifying the virtuous person requires independent criteria for wisdom (Louden, 1984). All three accounts describe practical wisdom richly but leave its essential nature unspecified.

A similar situation is faced by philosophers of classical and contemporary virtue ethics: they recognize practical wisdom as essential for living well, distinguish it convincingly from related capacities like intelligence or expertise, provide illuminating examples and analogies, yet ultimately characterize it through terms as vague as the concept they seek to clarify (Staudinger & Glück, 2011). Wisdom involves "perceiving salient features," but what makes features salient? It requires "hitting the mean," but how is the mean identified? It consists of "doing what the virtuous person would do," but who counts as virtuous? The wise person possesses "good judgment," but what makes judgment good rather than bad? Each answer presupposes what it purports to explain, leaving practical wisdom as what philosophers call a "thick ethical concept" (rich in content yet resistant to analysis into separable descriptive and evaluative components) (Williams, 1985; Gibbard, 1992).

This failure is consequential rather than merely academic. Without operational criteria, educators cannot design curricula that systematically cultivate wisdom, organizations cannot assess it in hiring or promotion decisions, individuals cannot reliably track their own development, and researchers cannot test theories about how wisdom is acquired or what enables it (Staudinger & Glück, 2011; Grossmann, 2017). The result is that practical wisdom, despite universal acknowledgment of its importance, remains peripheral to modern institutions: schools focus on knowledge transmission, workplaces reward technical skill, and research programs study measurable constructs. Classical philosophy's great achievement was recognizing practical wisdom's centrality; its great failure was never operationalizing it.

Modern Psychology: Measurement Without Foundation

Contemporary psychology approaches practical wisdom empirically, attempting to operationalize what philosophy left vague by developing measurement instruments, identifying component capacities, and testing theories about developmental trajectories and enabling conditions (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Sternberg, 1998; Ardelt, 2003). This empirical turn promises progress beyond philosophical speculation by grounding claims in data, yet examination reveals that measurement attempts inherit conceptual confusions from philosophy, producing instruments that assess something related to wisdom without capturing what makes judgment sound or unsound.

The Berlin Wisdom Paradigm, developed by Baltes and colleagues, defines wisdom as expert knowledge in the fundamental pragmatics of life, assessed through think-aloud responses to hypothetical life dilemmas (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Staudinger et al., 1998). Participants read scenarios involving difficult decisions (whether to accept a job offer requiring relocation, how to advise a friend contemplating suicide, whether to intervene in a family conflict) and verbalize their thinking while expert raters evaluate responses on five criteria: rich factual knowledge about life, rich procedural knowledge about life, lifespan contextualism (understanding life in temporal and developmental context), relativism (recognizing value pluralism), and uncertainty management (acknowledging limits of knowledge). The paradigm demonstrates impressive psychometric properties including inter-rater reliability, internal consistency, and discriminant validity (Baltes & Smith, 2008).

However, closer examination reveals conceptual problems. The five criteria, while plausible components of wisdom, do not explain what makes judgment wise: they describe characteristics wise people might possess without specifying what wisdom consists of (Ardelt, 2004). Rich knowledge helps but does not suffice: people can possess extensive knowledge yet apply it foolishly, and others with limited knowledge sometimes demonstrate remarkable wisdom (Meeks & Jeste, 2009). Lifespan contextualism and relativism might characterize wise responses, but they could equally characterize sophistical evasion or paralytic indecision: recognizing complexity and acknowledging multiple perspectives does not itself constitute sound judgment (Grossmann, 2017). The paradigm measures verbal facility in analyzing hypothetical dilemmas which may correlate with practical wisdom, but that differs from making

sound decisions under real-world constraints (such as emotional involvement, time pressure, and accountability for consequences) (Kahneman & Klein, 2009).

The Berlin Paradigm presupposes agreement about what counts as a wise response without providing independent criteria for making such judgments (Glück & Bluck, 2013). Expert raters receive training in scoring responses, but their expertise consists of recognizing wisdom when they encounter it: the same capacity that requires explanation. Older individuals, clinical psychologists, and those nominated as wise by peers score higher on the paradigm, confirming that the instrument distinguishes the groups as expected, yet the validation is circular: peer nominations already presuppose what wisdom is, which is precisely what the instrument is meant to establish. This discriminant validity begs the question: what makes these groups wise rather than merely experienced, educated, or socially skilled (Staudinger & Glück, 2011)? The paradigm measures something (a capacity for thoughtful analysis of life problems) but whether this something is practical wisdom rather than intelligence, education, or verbal ability remains unclear.

Sternberg's Balance Theory of Wisdom offers a different approach, defining wisdom as application of tacit knowledge mediated by values toward achievement of common good through balancing intrapersonal, interpersonal, and extrapersonal interests over short and long term (Sternberg, 1998, 2001). Wisdom requires metacognitive processes that coordinate thinking about oneself (intrapersonal), about others (interpersonal), and about broader contexts (extrapersonal), with values guiding how competing interests get balanced. This definition emphasizes wisdom's ethical dimension (concern for common good rather than merely for self-interest) and its practical orientation toward achieving balance rather than optimizing any single consideration.

Sternberg's approach proves conceptually richer than the Berlin Paradigm, as it focuses on values and practical consequences, yet it too fails operationalization. What counts as "common good" when people disagree about values? How does one balance competing interests when no principled basis for tradeoffs exists? What makes some value commitments wise and others foolish: is concern for common good itself sufficient, or does wisdom require particular values (Ardelt, 2004)? The theory presupposes what it purports to explain: wisdom consists of balancing interests well, but "well" means wisely, completing the circle. Assessment instruments based on this theory ask people to rate their own or others' tendency to balance interests and pursue common good, producing self-report data vulnerable to social desirability bias and lacking behavioral validation (Glück & Bluck, 2013).

Ardelt's Three-Dimensional Wisdom Scale represents a third approach, defining wisdom as the combination of a cognitive dimension (ability to understand life deeply, including intrapersonal and interpersonal dynamics), a reflective dimension (tendency to examine phenomena and one's own thoughts and behavior from multiple perspectives), and an affective dimension (sympathetic and compassionate love for others) (Ardelt, 2003, 2004). This multidimensional conception recognizes that wisdom requires integration of thinking, reflection, and caring rather than excellence in any single domain. The scale shows good psychometric properties and correlates with well-being, life satisfaction, and mastery, suggesting criterion validity (Ardelt & Oh, 2010).

Yet this scale also resists operationalization. The cognitive dimension assumes that understanding life "deeply" or "truly" can be assessed through agreement with statements like "Ignorance is bliss" (reverse scored) or "There is only one right way to do anything" (reverse scored), yet these items measure philosophical sophistication or cultural liberalism as much as wisdom (Glück & Bluck, 2013). The reflective dimension conflates productive reflection (examining experience to extract learning) with rumination (repetitive unproductive focus on problems), potentially rewarding overthinking (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).

The affective dimension presumes that compassion constitutes a wisdom component, yet one could imagine compassionate fools and wise individuals whose sympathies are appropriately limited (Bloom, 2016). However, the morality criterion does not rest on empathic feeling as such; it is evidenced by observable care — by whether one's actions treat affected parties with respect, whether one takes responsibility for consequences, and whether one acts to protect others' interests and dignity regardless of the warmth of one's sympathies.

Most fundamentally, the scale assesses self-reported tendencies and attitudes rather than actual judgment quality in concrete situations (Grossmann, 2017).

These three major psychological approaches demonstrate the same pattern: they identify plausible components of or correlates with wisdom (knowledge, values, reflection, compassion, perspective-taking), develop instruments assessing these components, validate instruments through psychometric analysis and correlation with other measures, yet never specify what makes judgment wise rather than unwise in ways that explain why these particular components matter (Staudinger & Glück, 2011). The instruments measure something (people do differ in knowledge, reflectiveness, and compassion, and these differences probably relate to wisdom) but the relationship remains unclear without a theory that explains what wisdom consists of and why these capacities contribute to it (Grossmann, 2017).

Recent work by Grossmann and colleagues represents a promising development, as it focuses on behavioral and process measures rather than self-report or hypothetical reasoning (Grossmann et al., 2010, 2020). Their "wise reasoning" construct emphasizes intellectual humility (recognizing limits of one's knowledge), consideration of others' perspectives, search for compromise, and acknowledgment of uncertainty (all assessed through coding of verbal reasoning about real personal dilemmas rather than through questionnaires or responses to hypothetical scenarios) (Grossmann, 2017). Studies demonstrate that these wise reasoning indicators correlate with relationship satisfaction, constructive conflict resolution, and well-being, providing evidence for criterion validity (Brienza et al., 2018). This approach succeeds in measuring observable reasoning processes rather than relying on self-assessment, thus representing a genuine methodological advance (Grossmann et al., 2020).

Yet even this sophisticated approach faces the fundamental problem: what makes these particular reasoning processes wise? Why should intellectual humility, perspective-taking, and uncertainty acknowledgment constitute wisdom rather than indecisiveness, susceptibility to influence, or lack of conviction? The circularity persists: these processes count as wise because wise people employ them, but identifying wise people requires independent criteria. Without a theory to explain what makes judgment sound, empirical research can document correlations between measured constructs and valued outcomes yet cannot explain why those correlations hold or whether the constructs actually capture wisdom (Staudinger & Glück, 2011).

Wisdom research remains marginal in psychology because it lacks a theoretical foundation that explains what is being measured and why it matters (Glück & Bluck, 2013). Interventions designed to cultivate wisdom show modest effects on measured constructs, but do not demonstrate increased quality of judgment in consequential situations (Grossmann et al., 2020). Educational applications remain underdeveloped because teachers cannot systematically cultivate what researchers cannot clearly specify. The empirical turn in wisdom research produced methodological sophistication without conceptual clarity: precise measurement of something whose nature remains essentially vague.

Beyond The Correspondence Theory Bottleneck: A Path Forward

The failures of both philosophical analysis and empirical measurement to operationalize practical wisdom stem from a common source: Western epistemology's commitment to correspondence theory, the view that true beliefs correspond to objective reality independent of human interpretation (Kirkham, 1992; Lynch, 2001). Correspondence theory creates an insurmountable obstacle for practical wisdom because it provides no mechanism for evaluating judgment in those domains where wisdom matters most.

Correspondence theory's appeal derives from paradigm cases where it appears obviously correct: the belief that snow is white is true if and only if snow is white, the belief that Paris is the capital of France is true if and only if Paris is the capital of France (Tarski, 1944). These examples suggest a general picture: beliefs aim at representing reality accurately, truth consists of successful representation, and knowledge requires beliefs that correspond to facts (Russell, 1912; Wittgenstein, 1921).

However, practical wisdom operates in domains where correspondence proves unavailable, underdetermined, or irrelevant. When judging uncertain futures (choosing careers, making investments, setting strategy) correspondence fails because the future does not yet exist to correspond to (Rorty, 1979; Dewey, 1938). When interpreting ambiguous evidence (diagnosing patient symptoms, understanding student difficulties, explaining organizational problems) correspondence proves underdetermined because multiple interpretations fit the same facts equally well (Kuhn, 1962; Schön, 1983). When making value judgments (balancing career and family, allocating resources among competing goods, choosing ethical principles) correspondence proves irrelevant because values constitute standards through which situations are evaluated rather than facts to which beliefs correspond (Williams, 1985; Putnam, 2002).

Correspondence theory thus faces a dilemma: either it applies only to trivial cases where wisdom is unnecessary (simple factual matters admitting direct verification), or it remains silent about difficult cases where wisdom is essential (uncertainty, underdetermination, value conflicts). Neither horn supports practical wisdom as achievable capacity. The problem manifests in both philosophical and psychological attempts at operationalization. Philosophers characterize practical wisdom through metaphors (hitting the mean, seeing what situations call for, making sound judgments) yet cannot specify what makes these achievements count as successful without circular appeal to wisdom itself (Hursthouse, 1999; Annas, 2011). Psychologists develop instruments measuring plausible wisdom components yet cannot explain why these components constitute wisdom rather than something else (Staudinger & Glück, 2011; Grossmann, 2017).

The correspondence bottleneck explains why twenty-five centuries of philosophical attention and decades of empirical research have not operationalized practical wisdom: the conceptual framework Western thought employs cannot in principle operationalize judgment in domains where correspondence is unavailable, underdetermined, or irrelevant, yet these are precisely the domains where practical wisdom operates (Rorty, 1979).

Operationalizing practical wisdom requires replacing correspondence with alternative evaluative criteria that apply where correspondence fails. The framework does not compete with correspondence theory; where factual matters admit direct verification, correspondence remains the appropriate standard. The framework addresses the domain where correspondence is unavailable, underdetermined, or irrelevant, and that is the domain where practical wisdom operates.

Preview: A Post-Realist Alternative

This thesis proposes that practical wisdom can be operationalized by replacing correspondence with three evaluative criteria that together provide standards for judgment in those domains where correspondence fails: coherence (logical integration of beliefs and conceptual clarity), utility (practical effectiveness and workability in lived experience), and morality (care for others via empathy and ethical responsibility).

These criteria do not supplement correspondence; they replace it as primary standards for evaluating judgment. Practical wisdom thus becomes the capacity for constructing workable interpretations rather than the achievement of discovering pre-existing truths.

Subsequent chapters develop this theme as a post-realist epistemology. Post-realism, as employed here, denotes the rejection of correspondence theory as the primary standard for evaluating beliefs, replacing it with criteria that apply precisely where correspondence is unavailable or irrelevant. This position transcends the traditional realism/anti-realism debate by maintaining that interpretations admit of rigorous evaluation without requiring that they correspond to mind-independent reality.

The post-realist framework builds on philosophical insights that twentieth-century thought developed yet rarely applied to practical wisdom: Kant's demonstration that knowledge involves interpretation through conceptual frameworks, Kuhn's underdetermination of theory by evidence, Rawls's reflective equilibrium, Popper's conjectural account of science, and Rorty's synthesis arguing that beliefs should be evaluated through consequences and

coherence rather than correspondence (Kant, 1781/1998; Kuhn, 1962; Rawls, 1971; Popper, 1959, 1963; Rorty, 1979, 1989, 1991).

Chapter 2 develops the theoretical foundation by explaining three values in detail: coherence, utility, and morality. It explains why they provide adequate evaluative standards without requiring correspondence, how they enable judgment in domains where correspondence is unavailable, and how practical wisdom operates through accommodation (conceptual reorganization in response to anomalies) and reflective equilibrium (achieving coherence between principles and judgments through mutual adjustment). Chapters 3 and 4 examine some psychological mechanisms and learning processes to show how metacognitive awareness, emotional regulation, and reflective practice enable the development of capacities that practical wisdom requires. Chapters 5 through 8 apply the framework across domains including education, professional life, public discourse, and interpersonal relationships, demonstrating how the same principles operate differently in different contexts. Chapter 9 translates abstract principles into concrete practices that operationalize wisdom development. Chapter 10 synthesizes potential contributions to philosophy, psychology, and education, showing how the framework provides operational standards and enables the systematic research, teaching, and cultivation of practical wisdom.

The framework's adequacy should be evaluated not through correspondence to reality (a standard it rejects) but through its coherence (logical consistency and conceptual clarity), utility (capacity to guide systematic wisdom development), and morality (contribution to human flourishing through improved individual and collective judgment). This application of evaluative criteria to the framework itself exemplifies the epistemic humility and intellectual responsibility that practical wisdom requires: acknowledging that theories are fallible interpretations subject to revision rather than final truths, while maintaining confidence that some interpretations prove better than others through explicit, publicly accessible standards.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that practical wisdom's twenty-five-century history has failed to produce a useful operational framework to validate its theories or guide its applications. This failure stems from Western philosophy's commitment to correspondence theory, which provides no mechanism for evaluating judgment in domains where wisdom matters most (situations involving uncertainty about facts, conflicts among values, and impacts on other persons). Classical philosophy recognized practical wisdom's importance yet characterized it too vaguely for operationalization. Contemporary psychology developed sophisticated measurement instruments yet inherited conceptual confusions that prevent specification of what makes judgment wise rather than unwise. Both failures reflect correspondence theory's inadequacy: the assumption that true beliefs correspond to objective reality leaves practical wisdom conceptually displaced, because it operates precisely where correspondence is unavailable, underdetermined, or irrelevant.

The thesis presented in this volume proposes a post-realist alternative: evaluating practical wisdom through coherence, utility, and morality rather than through correspondence. These criteria provide operational standards that apply where correspondence fails (when facing uncertain futures, when interpreting ambiguous evidence, and when making value judgments). The framework produces operationalization, not through incremental refinement of existing approaches, but through a fundamental reconceptualization of what wisdom is and how it can be evaluated.

Chapter 2 develops this framework in more detail, explaining what each criterion consists of, why they provide adequate standards without requiring correspondence, and how they apply to practical judgment. It demonstrates through systematic analysis why correspondence theory fails for practical wisdom, showing how that construct operates through accommodation and reflective equilibrium. The goal is not merely theoretical clarification but practical enablement: making practical wisdom systematically teachable, reliably assessable, and deliberately cultivable through methods that educators can employ, researchers can study, and individuals can practice.

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Chapter 2: The Operational Framework

Practical wisdom includes clarity about motives, beliefs, and values that enables workable judgment when correspondence to objective reality is unavailable or irrelevant.

The previous chapter diagnosed practical wisdom's operationalization failure as stemming from correspondence theory's inadequacy for domains where wisdom matters most and previewed the post-realist alternative: evaluating practical wisdom through coherence, utility, and morality. This chapter develops that alternative systematically, demonstrating why correspondence theory fails precisely where these three criteria prove necessary and showing how practical wisdom operates through accommodation and reflective equilibrium.

The chapter proceeds in four parts. First, it defines coherence, utility, and morality, explains why they provide adequate evaluative standards without requiring correspondence, and shows how they work together to evaluate practical judgment. Second, it establishes the fundamental distinction between facts and interpretations, showing why this distinction matters for practical wisdom and how correspondence theory obscures it. Third, it demonstrates correspondence theory's failure for practical judgment when correspondence proves unavailable, underdetermined, or irrelevant in wisdom-requiring situations. Fourth, it shows how practical wisdom operates through accommodation (conceptual reorganization in response to anomalies) and reflective equilibrium (achieving coherence between principles and judgments through mutual adjustment), and explains how this framework makes practical wisdom operational by specifying observable criteria and teachable capacities.

A Post-Realist Framework: Coherence, Utility, and Morality

Practical wisdom requires evaluative criteria that apply precisely where correspondence theory fails: when judging uncertain futures, interpreting ambiguous evidence, and making value judgments. This section develops the three criteria that together provide such standards: coherence (logical integration of beliefs and conceptual clarity), utility (practical effectiveness and workability in lived experience), and morality (care for others via empathy and ethical responsibility) (Surkes, 2025).

The post-realist framework builds on philosophical insights that twentieth-century thought developed yet rarely applied to practical wisdom. These criteria do not supplement correspondence but replace it as primary standards for

evaluating judgment when correspondence fails. They depict practical wisdom as a capacity for sound interpretation rather than as the achievement of accurate representations.

Kant (1781/1998) demonstrated that human knowledge is structured by categories of understanding rather than constituted by passive reception of sensory data, implying that all experience involves interpretation through conceptual frameworks. Kuhn (1962) showed that scientific theories are underdetermined by evidence and chosen partly for pragmatic virtues including simplicity, fruitfulness, and problem-solving power rather than through correspondence alone. Rawls (1971) articulated reflective equilibrium as a method for achieving coherence between general principles and particular judgments through mutual adjustment. Popper (1959, 1963) reconceived science as conjecture and refutation, with theories surviving through falsification attempts rather than being verified through correspondence to reality. Rorty (1979, 1989, 1991) synthesized these insights, arguing that beliefs should be evaluated through their consequences and coherence rather than through correspondence to mind-independent reality.

Coherence: Logical Integration and Conceptual Clarity

Coherence evaluates whether beliefs and values form logically consistent, conceptually clear systems that avoid contradiction and confusion. A set of beliefs coheres when they can all be true simultaneously without logical contradiction, when they mutually support rather than undermine each other, and when they integrate into systematic understanding rather than remaining isolated fragments (BonJour, 1985; Thagard, 2000). A person holds coherent beliefs about education who thinks that learning requires active engagement, that lectures alone prove insufficient for deep understanding, and that inquiry-based pedagogy promotes learning: these beliefs fit together and reinforce each other. The same person holds incoherent beliefs if simultaneously maintaining that learning requires active engagement while claiming that optimal pedagogy consists exclusively in lecturing: these beliefs contradict because accepting one provides reason to reject the other.

The coherence requirement extends beyond simple logical consistency to include what might be called conceptual clarity about what one's concepts mean, how they relate to one another, and how to apply them in practice. A manager who claims to value collaboration demonstrates conceptual confusion if implementing policies that pit employees against one another in zero-sum competition, not because the policies are wrong (that's a utility question) but because calling such arrangements "collaborative" misuses the concept in ways that obscure what one is actually doing (Rorty, 1989). An educator who advocates "student-centered learning" while maintaining absolute control over all pedagogical decisions demonstrates similar confusion: that concept commits one to at least some student voice and choice, so claiming the label while denying the commitment reveals conceptual unclarity (Dewey, 1938).

Coherence as evaluative standard does not require that belief systems be complete or final (since practical wisdom recognizes that understanding remains always partial and provisional), but it does require that beliefs within the system fit together without contradiction and that concepts are used consistently with their meaning (Rawls, 1971; Rescher, 1973).

Dewey developed this approach into a systematic theory of inquiry as problem-solving: beliefs emerge from problematic situations requiring resolution, function as hypotheses guiding experimental action, and prove adequate when they successfully resolve the originating problem (Dewey, 1938; Hildebrand, 2003).

Utility: Practical Effectiveness and Workability

Practical wisdom employs utility evaluation through assessing whether beliefs and values prove workable. First, predictive success: do beliefs enable accurate prediction of outcomes? A teacher believing that students learn best through discovery demonstrates utility if students using discovery methods show strong learning gains, but faces utility failure if outcomes prove poor (Kirschner et al., 2006). The failure does not necessarily mean abandoning the belief (perhaps implementation was flawed, or students needed more structure than pure discovery provides) but it does require acknowledging that prediction failed and revising either belief or practice (Schön, 1983). Second, problem-solving power: do beliefs guide effective responses to challenges? A manager interpreting team conflict as

personality clash demonstrates utility if interventions based on this interpretation resolve the conflict, but faces utility failure if conflict persists or worsens (Argyris, 1991). Third, sustainability: can one live by beliefs over time without generating new problems? A person valuing both career success and family relationships demonstrates utility if managing to honor both over time, but faces utility failure if the values generate persistent irresolvable conflict (Williams, 1981).

The utility standard's operational character derives from its empirical accessibility: whether beliefs prove workable can be assessed through observation of outcomes, with clear criteria for success and failure (Dewey, 1938). A bridge design proves useful if bridges built from it stand rather than collapse, a teaching method proves useful if students taught that way learn rather than remain confused, a conflict resolution approach proves useful if conflicts addressed through it get resolved rather than escalate. These assessments require care (success and failure must be defined appropriately, confounding factors must be controlled, and sufficient time must pass for consequences to manifest), but they are assessments that evidence can inform and that systematic investigation can improve (Shadish et al., 2002).

Critics might object that utility evaluation proves too narrow, reducing judgment to mere instrumental effectiveness divorced from deeper questions about what goals are worth pursuing. But utility in the relevant sense incorporates breadth: beliefs prove useful not merely for achieving arbitrary ends but for living well across multiple dimensions of human flourishing (Nussbaum, 2011; Sen, 1999). A decision that successfully achieves a narrow goal while undermining health, relationships, and values does not demonstrate utility in the robust sense practical wisdom requires (Schwartz & Sharpe, 2010). Utility assessment asks whether beliefs and values enable sustainable flourishing (helping people navigate their actual circumstances effectively, supporting meaningful relationships and projects, and providing satisfactory results).

The standard also incorporates temporal breadth: utility is assessed across time rather than merely through immediate outcomes. A belief that produces short-term benefits while generating long-term harm lacks utility properly understood (Dewey, 1938). A person believing that conflict is always best avoided might achieve short-term peace but long-term relationship deterioration as unaddressed issues accumulate (Gottman, 1994). A company pursuing quarterly profits through practices that undermine long-term viability lacks utility despite immediate financial gains (Collins, 2001). Practical wisdom requires temporal integration: considering both immediate and long-term consequences, recognizing that apparent short-term success can mask developing problems, and maintaining accountability to outcomes as they unfold (Schwartz & Sharpe, 2010).

Utility evaluation operates iteratively: initial beliefs guide action, outcomes provide feedback about utility, and beliefs are revised when outcomes prove inadequate. This makes practical wisdom fundamentally experimental in action: testing interpretations through action and revising them based on results (Dewey, 1938; Schön, 1983). A teacher trying a new pedagogical approach assesses utility through student learning outcomes, adjusting the approach when results disappoint and maintaining it when results impress. The process never achieves finality because circumstances change, requiring continued adaptation, but it does produce improvement as ineffective approaches get weeded out and effective ones retained (Ericsson et al., 1993). Practical wisdom consists partly in this experimental orientation: treating beliefs as revisable hypotheses rather than as dogmas, attending to feedback about their utility, and revising when evidence warrants.

Utility alone does not suffice for practical wisdom because useful beliefs and actions can be immoral (instrumental reasoning divorced from ethical constraint enables atrocity as effectively as it enables benefit) (Williams, 1985). A manipulation tactic might prove highly useful for achieving one's goals while treating others as mere means, demonstrating utility but lacking morality (Kant, 1785/1993). But utility remains necessary: beliefs and values that systematically fail to enable workable living cannot constitute practical wisdom regardless of their coherence or moral credentials (Dewey, 1938). Utility thus provides a second filter: after establishing coherence, practical wisdom requires that beliefs and values actually work (that they enable effective action, sustainable relationships, and meaningful projects).

Morality: Care for Others and Ethical Responsibility

Morality evaluates whether judgments reflect care for others through empathy, respect human dignity, and promote flourishing rather than harm. This criterion is operationalized through observable action rather than through the warmth of sympathetic feeling: a judgment demonstrates morality not by being accompanied by compassion but by treating affected parties with respect, taking responsibility for consequences, and acting to protect others' interests and dignity (regardless of the emotional state of the person making it). This distinction matters because well-intentioned people can cause harm, and practically wise judgment is assessed by what it does, not by how it feels from the inside.

A judgment demonstrates morality not merely by conforming to rules or by producing aggregate welfare maximization but by giving appropriate consideration to how it affects all persons impacted, by respecting their status as ends in themselves rather than mere means, and by promoting conditions for their flourishing (Noddings, 1984; Nussbaum, 2001; Kant, 1785/1993). A manager deciding layoffs demonstrates morality by considering impacts on affected employees and their families, by treating people with dignity throughout the process, and by providing support for transitions, not merely by achieving organizational efficiency goals (Schwartz & Sharpe, 2010). A policy-maker demonstrates morality by examining how proposals affect vulnerable populations, by ensuring that benefits and burdens distribute fairly, and by protecting basic human capabilities (Nussbaum, 2011; Rawls, 1971).

The moral standard draws on several philosophical traditions. Care ethics emphasizes empathy, attentiveness to particular others, and recognition that moral judgment occurs within relationships requiring maintenance rather than through application of abstract universal principles (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984; Held, 2006). Capabilities approach focuses on whether people have genuine opportunities for functioning and flourishing across multiple dimensions including health, education, practical reason, affiliation, and self-respect (Nussbaum, 2011; Sen, 1999). Kantian ethics demands treating persons as ends in themselves, never merely as means, respecting their rational agency and fundamental dignity (Kant, 1785/1993; Korsgaard, 1996). The framework synthesizes these insights: practical wisdom requires empathic attention to particular others (care), promotion of conditions for flourishing (capabilities), and respect for human dignity (Kantian respect).

Practical wisdom employs moral evaluation through several mechanisms. First, perspective-taking: considering how situations appear from others' viewpoints, what their interests and values are, how actions affect them from their perspective (Galinsky et al., 2005; Selman, 1980). A teacher deciding discipline demonstrates morality by considering how the student experiences correction (whether it helps them learn and improve or merely shames and discourages) not just whether it maintains classroom order (Noddings, 1984). Second, examining impacts: assessing who benefits and who bears costs from decisions, whether vulnerable parties receive appropriate protection, whether distributions prove fair (Rawls, 1971; Nussbaum, 2011). A business leader demonstrates morality by examining how strategy affects not only shareholders but also employees, customers, communities, and environment (Freeman, 1984; Schwartz & Sharpe, 2010). Third, respecting dignity: treating people as ends in themselves with their own goals and values deserving recognition, not merely as instruments for one's purposes (Kant, 1785/1993; Korsgaard, 1996).

The moral standard's operational character derives from its focus on observable treatment of persons and on consequences for their welfare. Whether someone demonstrates empathy can be assessed through their attentiveness to others' perspectives, whether they respect dignity can be evaluated through their treatment practices, and whether they promote flourishing can be examined through outcomes for affected parties. These assessments admit of varying degrees of reliability (sometimes empathy and respect are unambiguous, sometimes they require interpretation) but they are genuine assessments that evidence informs and that improvement through feedback can achieve (Batson, 2011; Hein et al., 2010).

Critics might object that morality proves too vague or contested to serve as evaluative standard (different moral frameworks offer conflicting guidance, making morality an unstable foundation for practical wisdom). But that objection mistakes the framework's approach. It does not require resolving all moral disagreement or establishing final moral truth, but rather considers whether judgments give genuine consideration to others' welfare, respect their

dignity, and promote their flourishing. These requirements admit of specification without requiring complete moral theory: giving genuine consideration means attending to others' perspectives rather than ignoring them, respecting dignity means treating people as ends rather than mere means, and promoting flourishing means acting to enable their capabilities rather than to undermine them (Nussbaum, 2011; Noddings, 1984).

Reasonable moral disagreement may remain about which capabilities matter most, how to balance competing interests, and what respect requires in particular situations. However, disagreements occur in a context which stipulates that others' welfare matters, dignity deserves respect, and flourishing should be promoted (Rawls, 1993; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). The framework rejects positions that deny these basic commitments: egoism (only my welfare matters), instrumental treatment of persons (others are mere means to my ends), and indifference to harm (flourishing or suffering is morally irrelevant). Within the broad space of moral views accepting care, respect, and flourishing as mattering, considerable disagreement proves compatible with the framework.

The moral dimension also incorporates what Frankfurt (1971) termed second-order volitions and Taylor (1985) termed strong evaluation: not merely desiring or choosing but evaluating desires and choices against frameworks of significance, asking what is worth wanting and what kind of person one aspires to be. Practical wisdom requires not only acting to promote others' flourishing but also examining one's own values and commitments critically, asking whether they reflect appropriate care or merely serve self-interest narrowly conceived (Frankfurt, 1971). A person might desire wealth and power (first-order desires) while recognizing that these desires, if pursued single-mindedly, would make one into someone morally diminished (second-order evaluation). Practical wisdom involves subjecting desires to this scrutiny, cultivating aspirations worth having rather than merely satisfying whatever cravings one happens to have (Taylor, 1985; Frankfurt, 1971).

Judgment lacking appropriate moral consideration cannot constitute practical wisdom regardless of its coherence or utility. Morality alone does not suffice for practical wisdom without coherence and utility, because acting with good will but without understanding or competence may produce harm despite good intentions (Weber, 1919/1946). A teacher with genuine care for students who lacks understanding of how learning works will fail to help them flourish despite moral motivation (Schön, 1983). The moral dimension provides a third filter: after establishing coherence and utility, practical wisdom requires that judgment treat affected parties with appropriate care, respect, and concern for flourishing.

Why These Three Criteria Suffice

Coherence ensures that beliefs and values form integrated systems rather than contradictory fragments, that concepts are used clearly rather than confusedly, and that reasoning proceeds validly rather than fallaciously (BonJour, 1985; Thagard, 2000). Utility ensures that beliefs and values prove workable in practice, that they enable effective action rather than generating practical failure, and that they support sustainable flourishing rather than undermining it (Dewey, 1938; James, 1907/1975). Morality ensures that judgment gives appropriate consideration to all affected parties, that it respects human dignity rather than treating persons as mere means, and that it promotes flourishing rather than causing harm (Noddings, 1984; Nussbaum, 2011; Kant, 1785/1993).

One might object that coherent, workable, and moral beliefs could nonetheless be systematically false in ways that matter practically. A pre-scientific community might hold perfectly coherent beliefs about disease transmission (miasma theory coheres internally), act effectively within those beliefs (quarantine measures reduce disease even under a false theory), and treat patients compassionately, yet still cause preventable harm that better correspondence to microbial reality would avoid. This objection suggests that correspondence adds something the three criteria miss: protection against systematic error that happens to work in the short term but fails catastrophically in ways not yet visible.

However, this objection reveals that 'correspondence' in such cases just means 'better utility over longer time horizons and broader populations,' which the utility criterion already captures through its requirement of temporal breadth and sustained workability. The miasma theory eventually fails utility tests when antibiotics cure infections that quarantine cannot, when epidemiological evidence contradicts transmission predictions, and when systematic

study reveals mechanisms the theory cannot explain. What appeared to be a correspondence objection turns out to be a utility objection about time scales and empirical scope.

What more could correspondence add? If beliefs cohere systematically, prove workable in practice, and result in treating people morally, what would knowing that they also correspond to reality-as-it-is-in-itself contribute to their adequacy as guides for living (Rorty, 1979, 1991)?

The sufficiency claim does not deny that correspondence applies in limited domains; factual claims about present observable states can and should be evaluated through verification. But practical wisdom operates in domains where correspondence fails, and for these domains the three criteria provide adequate standards (Dewey, 1938; Rorty, 1991). Future-directed judgment cannot correspond to non-existent states, but it can be evaluated for coherence (does the prediction integrate evidence systematically?), utility (does the forecast guide effective preparation?), and morality (does the decision treat affected parties appropriately?). Value judgment does not correspond to mind-independent moral facts, but it can be evaluated for coherence (do values form integrated systems?), utility (do they enable flourishing?), and morality (do they reflect appropriate care?).

Pluralism Without Relativism

A serious objection must be addressed directly. Two mutually incompatible belief systems might both satisfy all three criteria simultaneously. Consider two approaches to criminal sentencing: one framework prioritizes rehabilitation, directing resources toward treatment, education, and reintegration; another prioritizes proportional retribution, holding that just punishment requires that penalties match the severity of offenses. Both frameworks cohere internally, both prove workable in practice across different jurisdictions, and both treat affected parties with genuine moral concern, the first for offenders' capacity for change and victims' long-term safety, the second for victims' dignity and society's legitimate demand for proportionate accountability. Neither fails the three criteria, yet in hard cases they can generate divergent recommendations: a young first-time offender committing a serious offense might warrant a suspended sentence under one framework and a custodial sentence under the other. In such cases the three criteria do not determine which sentence is correct, but they require that whichever framework is applied be stated explicitly and examined openly, creating conditions under which the bias inherent in any human judgment becomes visible and contestable rather than concealed behind the appearance of neutral authority. That this transparency is urgently needed is confirmed rather than refuted by the empirical reality of rampant judicial bias under current systems, which operate without any such requirement and predictably produce concealed, unexamined, and largely uncorrectable prejudice. If this is possible, does the framework collapse into relativism, the view that all positions are equally valid and evaluation is merely a matter of preference?

The objection is real but the conclusion does not follow, because it conflates relativism with pluralism. Relativism claims that no evaluative standards distinguish better from worse positions. The post-realist framework claims something quite different: that the three criteria reliably identify positions that are clearly inadequate (those failing coherence, utility, or morality tests) while acknowledging that among positions meeting all three criteria, genuine reasonable disagreement can persist. These are not equivalent claims. The first abandons evaluation; the second specifies its limits.

Crucially, correspondence theory faces the same problem without acknowledging it. Kuhn (1962) demonstrated that competing scientific theories can fit the same evidence equally well, underdetermining theory choice in ways that require appeal to pragmatic virtues including simplicity, fruitfulness, and problem-solving power. Correspondence theory promises unique correct answers but cannot deliver them precisely where practical judgment operates. The post-realist framework does not promise uniquely correct answers; it promises that evaluation can distinguish the defensible from the indefensible, the coherent from the contradictory, the workable from the failed, and the moral from the harmful. Within the space of positions that survive these tests, reasonable people can disagree, and that disagreement does not indicate evaluative failure. It indicates that some questions admit multiple adequate answers, which is an honest epistemological conclusion rather than a concession to relativism.

The practical implication is significant. When two frameworks both satisfy the three criteria, practical wisdom does not demand artificial resolution of the disagreement. It demands transparency about what is genuinely contested, intellectual honesty about the limits of current evidence, and continued openness to revision as circumstances develop and new considerations emerge. Wisdom under genuine pluralism consists precisely in maintaining this honest acknowledgment rather than manufacturing false certainty to escape the discomfort of unresolved disagreement.

The three criteria work together. Maximum coherence with minimal utility or morality is inadequate (systematic evil remains evil despite its coherence). Maximum utility with minimal coherence or morality is inadequate (effective manipulation remains manipulation despite its utility). Maximum morality with minimal coherence or utility is inadequate (well-intended confusion remains confusion despite good intentions). Practical wisdom requires that beliefs and values must cohere systematically AND prove workable in practice AND treat people morally, with deficiency in any dimension undermining judgment quality (Surkes, 2025).

The criteria also admit of degrees and require balancing. Perfect coherence proves unachievable because human understanding remains partial, perfect utility proves impossible because circumstances change unpredictably, and perfect morality proves unrealistic because competing obligations generate irresolvable tensions (Williams, 1973, 1981; Rescher, 1973). Practical wisdom consists of making sound trade-offs: sometimes accepting minor incoherence to preserve utility, sometimes sacrificing some utility to honor moral commitments, sometimes compromising between competing moral obligations (Schwartz & Sharpe, 2010). The framework provides structure for these trade-offs by making explicit what is being balanced, enabling judgment about whether particular balances prove defensible.

Facts Versus Interpretations: A Fundamental Distinction

Practical wisdom requires distinguishing facts (phenomena accessible to observation and measurement whose existence does not depend on how humans interpret them) from interpretations (meanings humans assign to phenomena through conceptual frameworks that organize experience) (Rorty, 1979; Sellars, 1956). This distinction is more subtle than simple dichotomies (such as those between objective and subjective, or between observation and theory) suggest, because human experience involves interpretation and some claims are more directly verifiable than others. Confusing facts with interpretations (treating one's interpretations as if they were facts or demanding factual certainty when interpretation is necessary) constitutes a primary source of judgment errors (Hayakawa, 1939).

‘Facts’ are claims that are verifiable through observation and measurement, where competent observers using appropriate methods will reach agreement regardless of their theoretical commitments, values, or interpretive frameworks. The thermometer reads 72°F, the scale shows 150 pounds, the document contains 247 words: these are facts because they describe observable states accessible to measurement procedures that yield consistent results across observers (Carnap, 1928/1967). Scientific facts extend this category through instrumental observation: the wavelength of emitted light, the mass of a particle and the DNA sequence of a gene all count as facts because measurement procedures exist that competent practitioners apply consistently to reach agreement (Kuhn, 1962). Even complex scientific facts (the Earth orbits the Sun, evolution occurs through natural selection, atoms consist of protons, neutrons, and electrons) count as facts in the relevant sense because extensive evidence converges on these conclusions and competent scientists agree about them regardless of their broader theoretical or philosophical commitments (Kitcher, 1993).

In contrast, interpretations involve assigning meaning to facts through conceptual frameworks that organize experience into patterns, that explain why events occur as they do, that evaluate whether states of affairs are good or bad, and that prescribe appropriate responses. A student's low test score is a fact: the paper shows particular answers marked incorrect, the gradebook records a numerical value. Whether that low score reflects insufficient study, inadequate teaching, unclear questions, test anxiety, learning disability, or some combination requires interpretation (Schön, 1983). The interpretation matters because it guides response: if the problem is insufficient study, increased practice helps; if it is inadequate teaching, pedagogical adjustment is needed; if it is test anxiety, emotional support and alternative assessment become appropriate. Getting the interpretation right (matching interpretive framework to actual situation) constitutes practical wisdom in this domain (Schwartz & Sharpe, 2010).

The distinction proves subtle because interpretation permeates experience more thoroughly than naive realism acknowledges. Even simple perceptual judgments involve interpretive elements: seeing a face in a pattern requires conceptual categories that structure visual experience, recognizing an object as a chair involves applying concepts about function and design, identifying a sound as threatening depends on background beliefs about danger (Hanson, 1958; Kuhn, 1962). Sellars (1956) demonstrated that the empiricist myth of the given (the idea that sensory experience provides uninterpreted data that beliefs must match) is incoherent because even the simplest observational reports presuppose conceptual frameworks that structure what counts as observable. Seeing that the thermometer reads 72°F requires concepts of temperature, measurement, and numerical representation; the "raw" sensory experience of light patterns reflecting off the thermometer contains no inherent factual content until interpreted through these concepts (Sellars, 1956; Davidson, 1984).

Acknowledging interpretation's pervasiveness does not collapse the distinction between facts and interpretations into epistemic relativism, because some claims prove more directly verifiable and less dependent on theoretical frameworks than others. The claim that the thermometer reads 72°F can be verified by anyone who understands temperature measurement, regardless of their broader beliefs about thermodynamics or climate science. On the other hand, the claim that 72°F represents a comfortable temperature requires interpretation through frameworks involving human physiology, cultural norms, personal preferences, and acclimatization (frameworks that vary across individuals and contexts in ways that simple observational claims do not) (Putnam, 1981; Rorty, 1991). Practical wisdom consists partly in recognizing which claims are factual (broadly verifiable across observers and frameworks) and which are interpretive (requiring frameworks that reasonable people might contest), then calibrating confidence and justification requirements accordingly.

Treating interpretations as facts produces overconfidence, rigidity, and defensiveness, while treating facts as mere interpretations produces paralysis and relativism by failing to hold people accountable to shared standards. A manager who interprets an employee's behavior as reflecting a bad attitude treats this interpretation as a fact. This error leads to responses based on character judgment rather than on investigation of actual causes (which might include inadequate training, unclear expectations, personal difficulties, or systemic problems) (Argyris, 1991). The manager demonstrates a practical wisdom deficit not because the interpretation is necessarily wrong but because treating interpretations as facts prevents consideration of alternatives, blocks learning when initial responses fail, and damages relationships through inappropriate negative attribution (Ross, 1977; Gilbert & Malone, 1995). Conversely, a leader who treats observable performance data as mere interpretation, refusing to acknowledge that results fell short of standards because "that's just your perspective," enables poor performance and abandons accountability (Tetlock, 2002). Practical wisdom requires distinguishing what is factually verifiable from what is interpretively constructed, then reasoning appropriately given this distinction.

Correspondence theory suggests that all true beliefs correspond to facts, making interpretation appear as deficient form of knowledge that aspires to but fails to achieve factual status (Rorty, 1979). This picture misleads because it positions interpretation as necessarily inferior to fact-stating rather than recognizing that interpretation serves a different function (not representing reality, but making sense of it in ways that enable effective action and appropriate response) (Davidson, 1984; Rorty, 1991). A physician interpreting symptoms does not aspire to achieve correspondence between interpretation and disease-as-it-is-in-itself but rather to construct a useful understanding that guides effective treatment, with success measured through patient outcomes rather than through metaphysical correspondence (Groopman, 2007). A teacher interpreting student behavior does not seek correspondence to behavior-as-it-really-is but rather coherent understanding that enables an appropriate pedagogical response, with adequacy assessed through whether interpretation proves useful for helping students learn (Schön, 1983).

The post-realist framework makes this explicit: interpretation is not deficient fact-stating, it is a distinct cognitive activity requiring different evaluative standards. Facts are evaluated through correspondence because they aim at accurate representation of observable states. Interpretations are evaluated through coherence (internal consistency and integration with other beliefs), utility (effectiveness for solving problems and enabling action), and morality (appropriate treatment of persons affected by interpretations), because they aim at workable understanding rather than at accurate representation (Surkes, 2025). Practical wisdom consists largely in recognizing when correspondence applies (factual matters admitting direct verification) and when alternative criteria are necessary (interpretive matters requiring judgment), then reasoning appropriately given this recognition.

The facts-interpretations distinction, properly understood, does not reinstate metaphysical dualism or claim that facts exist independent of all human conceptual activity. Rather, it marks a pragmatic difference between claims more directly verifiable across frameworks and claims requiring frameworks that reasonable people contest. This pragmatic distinction suffices for practical wisdom because it enables calibrating confidence, allocating investigative effort, and holding people accountable in ways that undifferentiated talk about "knowledge" or "belief" does not support. Practical wisdom begins with recognizing that most judgment involves interpretation rather than fact-discovery, then proceeds by applying evaluative criteria (coherence, utility, morality) that actually illuminate interpretation quality rather than demanding correspondence that interpretation cannot achieve.

The distinction between facts and interpretations requires one further clarification. This chapter has treated the distinction as relatively stable, yet also acknowledged, following Sellars (1956), Hanson (1958), and Kuhn (1962), that perception itself is theory-laden and that even simple observational reports presuppose conceptual frameworks. Does theory-ladenness collapse the distinction entirely, leaving only interpretations and no facts? It does not, but it requires replacing a binary opposition with a spectrum of verifiability. Claims sit at different points along this spectrum depending on how much theoretical scaffolding their verification requires and how much agreement they generate across observers with different theoretical commitments. "The thermometer reads 72°F" requires minimal scaffolding and generates near-universal agreement regardless of the observer's broader theoretical commitments. "This policy caused unemployment to rise" requires substantial theoretical scaffolding involving economic models, causal inference methods, and contestable assumptions, and generates significant expert disagreement even among competent investigators examining identical data.

Practical wisdom consists partly in recognizing where a given claim sits on this spectrum and calibrating both confidence and justification requirements accordingly. Claims toward the directly verifiable end warrant confidence proportional to the reliability of measurement procedures; claims toward the heavily interpretive end warrant epistemic humility proportional to their dependence on contested frameworks. Treating a claim as more directly verifiable than it is produces the overconfidence and rigidity that Chapter 3 identifies as primary obstacles to wisdom. Treating a claim as more interpretive than it is produces the paralysis and evasion of accountability that undermines practical judgment equally. The spectrum formulation preserves the distinction's practical utility while fully honoring the insight that observation and interpretation are never entirely separable.

Why Correspondence Theory Fails for Practical Wisdom

Having established three evaluative criteria, and having clarified the facts-interpretations distinction, we can demonstrate systematically why correspondence theory fails for practical wisdom. The failure is not incidental but structural: correspondence theory applies only to factual claims about present observable states and provides no guidance for the interpretive judgments where wisdom proves necessary. This section demonstrates the failure through detailed analysis of three types of cases where correspondence proves unavailable, underdetermined, or irrelevant, showing that these are precisely the cases where the three criteria prove essential.

Unavailable Correspondence: Judging Uncertain Futures

Practical wisdom frequently requires judgments about future events that do not yet exist. A graduating student choosing between career paths (academic research versus industry position, large corporation versus startup, familiar geography versus relocation) must predict which option will prove more fulfilling, what opportunities will emerge, and how interests and values will evolve, yet the future remains genuinely open rather than determined (Dewey, 1938; Rorty, 1989). Correspondence theory provides no help: one cannot verify that beliefs about future satisfaction correspond to reality because the relevant reality (the student's future experience) does not yet exist to correspond to. The student must judge using available evidence (past experiences of satisfaction, current interests and values, information about career paths), but this evidence underdetermines the choice because people's preferences change, circumstances evolve unpredictably, and satisfaction depends on factors unknowable in advance (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Kahneman, 2011).

Financial investment decisions require predictions about market behavior, but financial markets exhibit sensitive dependence on initial conditions where small variations produce divergent outcomes, making long-term prediction impossible even with perfect knowledge of present conditions (Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2004). Policy decisions require forecasts about intervention effects in complex social systems, but such systems adapt to interventions in ways that defeat prediction based on past patterns (Meadows, 2008; Dorner, 1996). Personal relationship choices require judgments about compatibility and commitment sustainability, but relationships develop through interactions that cannot be fully anticipated and depend on decisions not yet made (Finkel, 2017).

In all these cases, correspondence theory faces a dilemma: either it claims that future states are already determined and judgment corresponds to these predetermined states, or it acknowledges genuine openness and admits that correspondence evaluation cannot apply. The first horn requires determinism that conflicts with current science: quantum mechanics demonstrates ontological indeterminacy, chaos theory reveals sensitive dependence on initial conditions, complex adaptive systems exhibit emergence where higher-level properties are not predictable from component behavior (Prigogine, 1997; Kauffman, 1995; Mitchell, 2009). The second horn admits that practical judgments about uncertain futures cannot be evaluated through correspondence, leaving them without standards unless alternative criteria are provided. Correspondence theorists might retreat to probabilistic correspondence (beliefs about future correspond to objective probabilities) but this just relocates the problem: what makes probability assignments correspond to objective probabilities when those probabilities themselves are contested or unknowable (Hájek, 2012; Taleb, 2007)?

Practical wisdom operates in this domain of unavailable correspondence. The wise person recognizes that future states are not fully determined, that prediction involves uncertainty that cannot be eliminated, and that judgment must proceed despite this uncertainty rather than waiting for impossible guarantees (Schwartz & Sharpe, 2010). Evaluation occurs through the three criteria introduced in Chapter 1. Coherence asks: do beliefs about the future cohere with available evidence and other commitments? Utility asks: do decisions prove workable given how circumstances actually develop? Morality asks: are impacts on affected parties given appropriate consideration?

The post-realist framework makes this explicit: judgments about uncertain futures are not evaluated through correspondence because nothing exists to correspond to, but through whether they represent coherent integration of available evidence, whether they prove useful for effective action, and whether they treat affected parties appropriately.

Underdetermined Correspondence: Interpreting Ambiguous Evidence

Practical wisdom often operates in domains where evidence equally supports multiple incompatible interpretations, making correspondence underdetermined even for judgments about present or past events.

A teacher observing student disengagement must determine whether the situation reflects boredom with material, confusion about concepts, anxiety about performance, fatigue from overwork, distraction by personal problems, or alienation from classroom culture.

Yet in such cases available evidence (facial expressions, body language, work quality, attendance patterns) may fit all these interpretations (Schön, 1983). Correspondence theory suggests that a correct interpretation corresponds to the student's experiences, but this suggestion proves unhelpful because there is no direct access to mental states that would settle the question (Dennett, 1987; Rorty, 1979).

Underdetermination is not merely epistemic (a temporary ignorance that further investigation will resolve) but often remains even with extensive additional evidence. A physician diagnosing a patient presenting with fatigue, muscle pain, and cognitive difficulties confronts differential diagnosis including chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, depression, thyroid disorder, sleep apnea, autoimmune conditions, and others, with most lacking definitive diagnostic tests and many sharing symptom profiles (Groopman, 2007; Kassirer, 2010). Additional testing may narrow possibilities yet still leave multiple viable diagnoses consistent with evidence. Treatment choices must be made despite this uncertainty, with wisdom consisting not in achieving impossible diagnostic certainty but in

selecting interventions that address most likely causes, that minimize risks, and that allow iterative refinement as response to treatment provides feedback (Groopman, 2007).

Underdetermination reveals correspondence theory's inadequacy for practical judgment. The theory presumes a God's-eye view that compares interpretations against reality-as-it-is-in-itself, but humans lack such access and must often choose among interpretations using evidence that underdetermines choice (Putnam, 1981; Rorty, 1979). Correspondence theorists might appeal to inference to best explanation (choose the interpretation that best explains available evidence) but "best" requires evaluative criteria beyond correspondence, criteria that implicitly invoke coherence (integration with background knowledge), utility (problem-solving power), and sometimes moral considerations (implications for human welfare) (Lipton, 2004; Harman, 1965).

Practical wisdom operates in this domain of underdetermined correspondence by applying the three evaluative criteria that actually illuminate interpretation quality. A teacher demonstrating wisdom constructs interpretations that cohere with multiple information sources (test performance, class participation, conversations with student and parents), that prove useful for a pedagogical response, and that treat the student fairly by avoiding premature negative attribution (such as assuming laziness rather than investigating difficulties) (Schön, 1983). If interpretation suggests confusion, remedial teaching helps; if it suggests anxiety, emotional support helps. The teacher recognizes that multiple interpretations may fit the evidence, tests interpretations through interventions that yield feedback about accuracy, and revises their understanding as new information emerges. Success is measured not through correspondence to "the real explanation" but through whether interpretation proves coherent, useful, and moral in guiding effective teaching.

Legal judgment is another domain where evidence underdetermines interpretation. A jury hearing testimony about an alleged crime must determine whether the defendant's actions constitute the charged offense. However, the same actions may admit multiple interpretations (self-defense versus aggression, mistake versus criminal intent, provocation versus premeditation), with available evidence supporting multiple stories about what happened and why (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Correspondence theory suggests that one interpretation corresponds to what really happened, but there is no direct access to this reality, and the evidence may be ambiguous. Legal institutions acknowledge this through standards like "beyond reasonable doubt" (not requiring certainty, but recognizing that judgment must occur despite interpretive underdetermination) (Laudan, 2006). Jurors demonstrating practical wisdom must construct interpretations that cohere with evidence presented (avoiding selective attention or motivated reasoning), that consider alternative explanations (not rushing to judgment), and that take seriously the gravity of conviction for the defendant (moral consideration).

The post-realist framework positions this as normal rather than deficient: interpretation is underdetermined by evidence because interpretation involves constructing meaning rather than discovering pre-existing fact, and multiple meanings can coherently organize the same evidence (Kuhn, 1962; Rorty, 1991). Practical wisdom consists of recognizing underdetermination, avoiding false certainty, constructing interpretations through explicit consideration of coherence, utility, and morality, and remaining open to revision as new evidence emerges.

Irrelevant Correspondence: Making Value Judgments

The third and most fundamental domain where correspondence theory fails involves value judgments where truth does not consist in correspondence to mind-independent facts. A person deciding whether to prioritize career advancement or family relationships faces a value question, not a factual one: there exists no fact about which choice is objectively correct independent of the person's values and commitments (Williams, 1985; Raz, 1986). Correspondence theory might suggest that one choice corresponds to "the good" or to "human flourishing," but these suggestions either make substantive value commitments that reasonable people contest or remain so abstract as to provide no guidance for particular choices (MacIntyre, 1981; Rawls, 1971).

The irrelevance of correspondence for value judgments does not stem from subjectivism or emotivism (the view that value judgments merely express preferences or feelings without cognitive content), but from recognizing that values constitute standards through which situations are evaluated rather than facts to which beliefs correspond (Putnam, 2002; Rorty, 1989).

When a community determines resource allocation among competing legitimate needs (such as education versus healthcare, environmental protection versus economic development, or public safety versus civil liberty), the decision involves value judgments about which priorities matter most in this situation, what tradeoffs prove acceptable, and how to balance incommensurable goods (Raz, 1986; Chang, 1997). These are genuine judgments admitting of better and worse (some allocations cohere better with the community's considered values, some prove more workable given the circumstances, some treat affected parties more fairly), but they are not factual judgments admitting correspondence evaluation because values constitute the standards through which facts are evaluated rather than being themselves facts (Putnam, 2002).

The three criteria provide the evaluative structure correspondence cannot. Coherence asks whether the allocation coheres with the community's considered judgments about justice, fairness, and human needs—not whether it corresponds to abstract Justice-in-itself. Utility asks whether the allocation enables the community to function sustainably, whether it addresses urgent needs effectively, and whether it proves workable given institutional capacities—not whether it corresponds to the Optimal Allocation. Morality asks whether the decision gives appropriate weight to the most vulnerable, whether it treats all affected parties with dignity, and whether it distributes burdens fairly—not whether it corresponds to objective Moral Truth. The criteria apply precisely because correspondence does not.

Accommodation and Reflective Equilibrium: How Practical Wisdom Operates

Having demonstrated why correspondence theory fails for practical wisdom and why the three evaluative criteria (coherence, utility, morality) prove necessary, this section explains how practical wisdom actually operates through two central mechanisms: accommodation (conceptual reorganization in response to anomalies), and reflective equilibrium (achieving coherence between principles and judgments through mutual adjustment). These mechanisms explain how practical wisdom develops and functions without requiring correspondence to reality-as-it-is-in-itself.

Accommodation, in Piaget's (1952) theory of cognitive development, describes conceptual reorganization occurring when existing schemas cannot adequately incorporate new experience. Unlike assimilation, where experience is fitted into existing frameworks with minimal adjustment, accommodation involves revising frameworks themselves when they prove inadequate. A child who believes that all four-legged animals are dogs accommodates when encountering a cat, recognizing that the four-legged schema underdifferentiates and requires revision into separate categories (Piaget, 1952; Carey, 1985). An adult who interprets disagreement as personal attack accommodates when recognizing that disagreement can reflect different perspectives deserving consideration rather than reflecting hostility requiring defense (Mezirow, 1991).

Practical wisdom involves the willingness to accommodate rather than defending existing interpretations rigidly. A manager whose strategy proves unsuccessful demonstrates wisdom by examining why it failed and revising understanding, rather than by rationalizing failure or blaming external factors (Argyris, 1991). A teacher whose pedagogy produces poor learning outcomes demonstrates wisdom by questioning assumptions about learning, rather than by blaming students (Schön, 1983). This capacity depends on metacognitive awareness (recognizing when one's interpretations are mistaken) and epistemic humility (acknowledging that one’s current understanding is incorrect) (Flavell, 1979; Whitcomb et al., 2017). These capacities can be systematically cultivated through practices including reflection on experience, seeking feedback about judgment quality, and deliberately considering alternative interpretations (Grossmann, 2017).

Accommodation proves difficult when existing frameworks structure perception and interpretation in ways that make alternatives invisible or incomprehensible. Kuhn (1962) showed that scientists working in different paradigms see different things when observing the same phenomenon, with paradigm shifts requiring gestalt-like

reorganization that cannot be forced through logic alone. This difficulty indicates that accommodation often requires external prompting (feedback from others, failure of predictions, or accumulation of anomalies that framework cannot explain) rather than occurring spontaneously through internal reflection (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Mezirow, 1991). Practical wisdom consists partly in seeking such prompting deliberately: asking for feedback, testing interpretations against alternatives, and maintaining openness to evidence that current understanding may be mistaken (Grossmann, 2017).

Reflective equilibrium, in Rawls's (1971) method for justifying principles of justice, describes achieving coherence between general principles and particular considered judgments through mutual adjustment. One begins with considered judgments (specific moral intuitions about particular cases where one has high confidence, such as slavery is wrong, keeping promises matters, gratuitous cruelty is impermissible) and with general principles that seem plausible (people deserve equal respect, welfare should be promoted, rights should be protected). When principles and judgments conflict (when the principle seems to imply a judgment one rejects or when judgments do not cohere under any available principle), one revises either principles or judgments to restore coherence (Rawls, 1971; Daniels, 1979, 1996).

This method is relevant to practical wisdom because it describes how sound judgment operates generally, not just in moral philosophy. A teacher holds considered judgments about particular students and general principles about learning; when these conflict, reflective equilibrium requires examining both: perhaps the principle overgeneralizes and requires qualification, or perhaps the judgment reflects bias or incomplete understanding requiring revision (Schön, 1983). Practical wisdom consists of this willingness to revise either principles or judgments in pursuit of coherence rather than defending initial positions rigidly.

Foundationalist approaches privilege either principles (rationalism) or particular judgments (intuitionism) as basic, treating the other as derivative. Reflective equilibrium differs fundamentally because it treats both as provisional and revisable, with neither having absolute authority (Rawls, 1971; Daniels, 1996). This proves epistemologically modest (admitting that understanding is fallible and incomplete) while maintaining that judgments can be improved through the iterative process of mutual adjustment (Rorty, 1991). The modesty reflects post-realist recognition that neither principles nor judgments correspond to reality-as-it-is-in-itself in ways that would establish their finality; both are human constructions subject to revision as understanding deepens.

Practical wisdom employs reflective equilibrium through several practices. First, it examines whether actions cohere with stated values: do choices reflect what one claims to care about, or do they contradict professed commitments (Frankfurt, 1988)? When actions and values conflict, wisdom requires questioning both (perhaps values need revision, or perhaps actions need reform, or perhaps understanding of what values require needs refinement). Second, it tests whether general principles apply well to particular cases: do principles generate judgments one can endorse on reflection, or do they produce implications that one must reject (Rawls, 1971)? When principles yield unacceptable implications, wisdom requires revising them rather than forcing acceptance of the implications. Third, it examines whether particular judgments cohere with one another: do responses to similar situations prove consistent, or do apparent similarities mask relevant differences requiring different treatment (Dancy, 2004)?

The iterative character of accommodation and reflective equilibrium indicates that practical wisdom never achieves finality. Understanding remains revisable when new experience produces anomalies requiring accommodation, and when consideration reveals incoherence requiring equilibration (Rescher, 1973; Dewey, 1938). This revisability does not undermine practical wisdom, but constitutes it; wisdom consists precisely in this continued willingness to learn, to revise, to improve understanding rather than in achieving final static comprehension (Mezirow, 1991). The framework thus positions wisdom as fundamentally dynamic, as a method rather than as an achievement, and as a commitment to continued learning rather than the attainment of mastery (Dweck, 2006; Grossmann, 2017).

Making Practical Wisdom Operational

Practical wisdom is made operational by applying the observable criteria of coherence, utility, and morality and particular teachable capacities, such as distinguishing facts from interpretations, detecting incoherence, evaluating

utility, considering moral implications, and engaging in accommodation and reflective equilibrium. This operationalization resolves a twenty-five hundred year-old conundrum by providing what correspondence theory cannot: standards that apply to resolving complex problems, and cognitive capacities that systematic instruction can cultivate.

Observable Criteria

Coherence admits of assessment through logical analysis of belief systems, conceptual analysis of term usage, and examination of systematic integration. Does the person's reasoning avoid contradiction? Are concepts used consistently with their meanings? Do beliefs fit together or remain isolated? These questions can be answered through careful analysis that does not require correspondence to reality, making coherence objectively assessable even while acknowledging that assessments themselves involve interpretation (Thagard, 2000; Harman, 1986). Educational interventions teaching logical reasoning, conceptual analysis, and systematic thinking directly target coherence capacities (Lipman, 2003; Ennis, 1987).

Utility admits of assessment through empirical observation of outcomes. Do our beliefs enable accurate prediction? Do our interpretations guide effective action? Do our values support sustainable flourishing? These questions are answered by examining evidence about consequences and by specifying clear criteria for success and failure (Dewey, 1938; Shadish et al., 2002). A teaching method proves useful if students learn, a medical treatment proves useful if patients improve, a conflict resolution approach proves useful if conflicts are resolved; these results are assessable through observation and measurement. Educational interventions using problem-based learning and inquiry-based approaches target utility evaluation by engaging students in authentic judgment tasks where consequences provide feedback (Hmelo-Silver et al., 2007; Krajcik & Blumenfeld, 2006).

Morality admits of assessment through examining the treatment of persons and the consequences for their welfare. Does a judgment indicate empathy through attending to others' perspectives? Does it respect dignity through treating people as ends rather than means? Does it promote flourishing through enabling capabilities? These questions can be addressed through observation of behavior and analysis of impacts, making morality assessable without requiring that moral realism be true (Batson, 2011; Nussbaum, 2011). Educational interventions using perspective-taking exercises, moral reasoning discussions, and service learning directly target moral capacities (Selman, 1980; Galinsky et al., 2005; Noddings, 1984).

Teachable Capacities

The three-value framework specifies capacities that practical wisdom requires and that systematic instruction can cultivate.

Distinguishing facts from interpretations can be taught through exercises identifying observable phenomena versus meanings assigned, through analysis of how different observers interpret events differently, and through reflecting on how interpretations shift with mood and perspective (Hayakawa, 1939; Korzybski, 1933). Detecting incoherence can be taught through training in logical reasoning, through practice identifying contradictions in one's own and others' thinking, and through learning to recognize conceptual confusion (Lipman, 2003; Paul & Elder, 2006). Evaluating utility can be taught through engaging with authentic problems where consequences provide feedback, through reflecting on when predictions succeed or fail, and through examining what makes actions effective or ineffective (Dewey, 1938; Schön, 1983).

Considering moral implications can be taught through perspective-taking exercises that develop empathy, through moral reasoning discussions that examine how decisions affect various stakeholders, and through analysis of case studies where moral dimensions prove salient (Noddings, 1984; Kohlberg, 1984; Rest, 1986). Engaging in accommodation can be taught through reflection on experience highlighting when existing frameworks fail, through exposure to alternative perspectives that challenge assumptions, and through creating safe environments where belief revision proves psychologically possible rather than threatening (Mezirow, 1991; Grossmann, 2017). Practicing reflective equilibrium can be taught through examining coherence between stated values and actual

choices, through testing whether principles apply well to particular cases, and through developing comfort with provisional understanding that remains revisable (Rawls, 1971; Daniels, 1996).

These are not vague aspirations but specific, teachable skills with established pedagogical methods. The operationalization succeeds because it specifies what learners need to be able to do (distinguish facts from interpretations, detect contradictions, evaluate utility, consider impacts on others, revise beliefs in light of evidence) and because it identifies practices that develop these abilities (logical reasoning instruction, perspective-taking exercises, problem-based learning, moral reasoning discussions, reflective writing). Educational research can assess whether instruction in these capacities produces measurable improvement, can identify which pedagogical approaches prove most effective, and can track development through longitudinal studies. The framework makes practical wisdom concrete enough to observe and measure.

Chapter 9 develops assessment approaches that operationalize these criteria into specific evaluation instruments.

Conclusion

This chapter has developed the post-realist framework for practical wisdom by defining coherence, utility, and morality, demonstrating why they prove necessary through systematic analysis of correspondence theory's failures, and showing how practical wisdom operates through accommodation and reflective equilibrium.

Correspondence theory fails for practical wisdom not because it is wrong about everything but because it applies only to factual claims about present observable states and provides no guidance for interpretive judgments about uncertain futures, underdetermined evidence, and value conflicts.

Coherence provides logical consistency and conceptual clarity, utility assesses practical effectiveness and workability, and morality prescribes appropriate treatment of persons and promotes flourishing. Together they provide adequate standards for practical judgment because they address the dimensions that actually matter for living well.

The framework makes practical wisdom operational by specifying observable criteria and teachable capacities. Coherence, utility, and morality can be assessed through analysis and observation that do not require correspondence to reality. The capacities they require (distinguishing facts from interpretations, detecting incoherence, evaluating utility, considering moral implications, engaging in accommodation and reflective equilibrium) can be systematically cultivated through established pedagogical methods.

The theoretical foundation is now complete: practical wisdom consists of making sound interpretations and judgments using coherence, utility, and morality as evaluative criteria, operating through accommodation and reflective equilibrium, with correspondence abandoned as regulative ideal that proved both unachievable and unnecessary for the judgments that practical wisdom involves. Subsequent chapters will apply this framework across domains (education, professional life, public discourse, interpersonal relationships) and develop concrete practices for wisdom cultivation.

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Author's Curriculum Vitae

Mission

My objective is to produce educational materials and events about theories and practices associated with higher-order reasoning and conflict resolution. My message is that information about the basic processes involved in deep learning (critical thinking and moral discernment) should be disseminated throughout our educational institutions.

Education

Doctor of Philosophy, Educational Technology 2009
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Dissertation on *Facilitating Higher-Order Thinking: Synthesizing Pedagogical Frameworks for the Development of Complex and Coherent Conceptual Systems.*
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Bachelor of Arts, Honours in Philosophy (Great Distinction), W. R. Fraser Medal. 2003
Concordia University, Montreal.

Master of Science, Neurobiology 1977
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California
Research in electrical stimulation of the central nervous system in mammals and psychophysics of the human visual system.

Bachelor of Science, Physiological Psychology (First Class Honours). McGill University, Montreal 1974

Academic Awards

Concordia University Graduate Fellowship	2003-2006
Fonds de Recherche sur la Société et la Culture (Québec) Graduate Fellowship for Studies in Philosophy	2003 (declined)
W. R. Fraser Medal for Philosophy	2003
Concordia Arts and Science Scholarship	2002
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Hansen Fellowship	1974-1977
Spencer Fellowship	1974-1977
J.W. McConnell Scholarship	1972, 1973

Employment History

Research Assistant and Postdoctoral Fellow 2003-2013

Centre for the Study of Learning and Performance, Concordia University, Montreal. Research Projects: Meta-analysis of studies of effectiveness of distance education; development of a questionnaire designed to predict the success of distance education students; meta-analysis of studies of the effects of educational interventions on the development of critical thinking skills; review of E-learning for the Canadian Council on Learning.

Part-Time Faculty, Concordia University 2010-2011

Instructor for SCOL270 (Historical, Philosophical, and Social Aspects of Science) at the Science College.

Teaching Assistant 2005-2006

Fundamental Methods of Inquiry, Department of Education, Concordia University, Montreal. Graduate level course. Responsible for designing, delivering, and assessing six online assignments in reflective writing and action planning.

Information Systems Consultant 1985-2000

Clients included Arrow Canada, Alcan, Squibb Canada.

Systems Analyst and Developer 1982-1985

Arrow Canada, Montreal. Developed and installed accounting and production systems on IBM System/38 and System/400.

Programmer/Analyst and Training Manager 1980-1982

Syntax Systems, Montreal. Developed and implemented a training program for 10 junior programmers and supervised their production; as senior analyst and project leader designed, developed and installed payroll, order entry, billing and sales analysis systems on IBM System/34.

Languages

Excellent English, good French.

Publications

Article

Surkes, Michael A. (2025, July 7). Applying Coherence, Morality, and Utility Toward Developing Practical Wisdom. University of Chicago Center for Practical Wisdom newsletter. https://wisdomcenter.uchicago.edu/news/discussions/applying-coherence-morality-and-utility-toward-developing-practical-wisdom

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Presentations

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Schmid, R. F., Borokhovski, E., Tamim, R., Bernard, R., Abrami, P.C., Wade, A., Surkes, M. A., Lowerison, G., Lysenko, L., and Galofre, C. (2009, April). Effect of Computer-Based Technology Use in Post-Secondary Education: Preliminary Findings of a Meta-Analysis. Presented at the Annual Meeting of The American Educational Research Association, San Diego.

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Co-Authored Publications

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